Dragonfly: next generation sandbox by Berni, Simone
Alma Mater Studiorum · Università di Bologna
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An endless battle between malwares and malware analysts is fought every
day. Many techniques of analysis are deployed, allowing the study of targets
in a clean environment. Isolation is commonly provided by sandboxes, but
it is not the only way: a new paradigm is emerging, emulation, that allows
the study of targets without having to fear that its own infrastructure can
be infected.
Malwares are detected and categorized using rules, simple regex queries that
describe their behaviours and are matched against the static sample, but
thanks to the emulation we can move this process a step further: Dragonfly
allows deeper and more precise rules that are matched during the emulation
of the target, allowing even the execution of custom user functions when a
rule is matched to bring the analysis to its next step.
The thesis is divided into three chapters, and in the following their de-
scription.
Chapter1 provides a brief description of concepts that the reader must know,
focusing on emulation, malware analysis methodologies, and sandboxes.
Chapter 2 describes the Qiling frameworks, with a focus on its goal, architec-
ture, and functionalities. Moreover, its explained its usage, the issues that
have been found, and the results when used with real world malwares.
The chapter 3 explains what is the personal contribution of the author in
the malware analysis field: the main object of this dissertation is Dragonfly,
its architecture, usage, rules, results and future development. A brief de-
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Malware is any software intentionally designed to cause damage to a com-
puter, server, client, or computer network1. A wide variety of types of mal-
ware exist, including computer viruses, worms, Trojan horses, ransomware,
spyware, adware, rogue software, and scareware.
Malware analysis is the study or process of determining the functionality,
origin and potential impact of a given malware sample2.
The method by which malware analysis is performed typically falls under one
of two types:
• Static analysis is performed by dissecting the different resources of
the binary file without executing it and studying each component.
• Dynamic analysis is performed by observing the behavior of the mal-
ware while it is actually running on a host system.
A sandbox is a security mechanism for separating running programs from
the infrastructure, usually in an effort to mitigate system failures or software
vulnerabilities from spreading: the ideal environment to perform malware
analysis. A sandbox typically provides a tightly controlled set of resources
1https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/tn-archive/
dd632948(v=technet.10) (visited on 16/05/20)
2https://web.archive.org/web/20160418151823/http://www.ijarcsse.com/
docs/papers/Volume_3/4_April2013/V3I4-0371.pdf) (visited on 16/05/20)
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for guest programs to run in, such as storage and memory space. Network
access, the ability to query the host system and read from input devices are
usually disallowed or heavily restricted, not allowing the sample analysed to
perform malicious activities on the host machine.
To solve the issues of configuring and maintaining a complex sandbox
system, malware analysis is going toward a new paradigm, emulation. It
is possible to emulate the malware, directly in the host machine, without
building the infrastructure that a sandbox requires, and, it is possible to
have a fine-grain control of the environment that the malware is using.
1.1 Emulation
Emulation commonly refers to the use of one hardware device to mimic
the function of another hardware device. In that sense, emulation is the use
of software to emulate hardware, and on top of it, it is possible to execute
an higher level of software.
The core of the emulation is the translation of the target instruction set to
the user instruction set. CPU instructions must be translated, but even the
memory management and the GPU instructions have to be considered.
After having emulated the hardware, the foundations are done: now it is
possible to build over this emulated hardware new software, add features, or
let the user monitor and change the behaviour of the lower levels. The su-
pervision of the emulation is done through hooks, a sort of APIs that allows




QEMU3 is a hosted virtual machine monitor: it emulates the machine’s
processor through dynamic binary translation and provides a set of different
hardware and device models for the machine, enabling it to run a variety
of guest operating systems. It can also be used with KVM4 to run virtual
machines at near-native speed (by taking advantage of hardware extensions
such as Intel VT-x). QEMU can also do emulation for user-level processes,
allowing applications compiled for one specific architecture to run on top of
another one.
QEMU can be used in two different operating modes:
• User-mode emulation: it is able to run Unix programs that were
compiled for a different instruction set.
• System emulation: it is able to run operating systems for any ma-
chine, on any supported architecture.
The core binary translation engine that allows QEMU to emulate foreign
processors on any given supported host is called The Tiny Code Generator :
the TCG works by translating each guest instruction into a sequence of host
instructions. As a result there will be a level of inefficiency, which means
TCG code will not be as fast as running native code.
1.1.2 Unicorn Engine
Unicorn Engine5 is a lightweight, multi-platform, multi-architecture CPU
emulator framework based on QEMU. Unicorn offers some unparalleled fea-
tures:
• Multi-architecture: ARM, ARM64 (ARMv8), M68K, MIPS, SPARC,
and X86 (16, 32, 64-bit)
3https://github.com/qemu/qemu (visited on 17/05/20)
4https://www.linux-kvm.org/page/Main_Page (visited on 17/05/20)
5https://github.com/unicorn-engine/unicorn (visited on 17/05/20)
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• Clean/simple/lightweight/intuitive architecture-neutral API
• Implemented in pure C language, with bindings for Crystal, Clojure,
Visual Basic, Perl, Rust, Ruby, Python, Java, .NET, Go, Delphi/Free
Pascal, Haskell, Pharo, and Lua.
• Native support for Windows & *nix (with Mac OSX, Linux, *BSD &
Solaris confirmed)
• High performance via Just-In-Time compilation
• Support for fine-grained instrumentation at various levels
• Thread-safety by design
Unicorn is designed to be used as a framework to create over it different
tools: its showcase is endless, and some of the most famous ones that use or







6https://github.com/radareorg/radare2 (visited on 18/06/20)
7https://github.com/hugsy/gefn (visited on 18/06/20)
8https://github.com/angr/angr (visited on 18/06/20)
9https://github.com/Gallopsled/pwntools (visited on 18/06/20)
10https://github.com/cuckoosandbox/cuckoo (visited on 18/06/20)
11https://github.com/Battelle/afl-unicorn (visited on 18/06/20)
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The power of Unicorn is that it is possible to insert hooks during the emu-
lation: it is possible to read or write a specific address, execute a callback
if a specific opcode is found, hook an entire block or a specific interrupt,
making it useful to understand at a deeper level how the sample emulated
really works.
Many bugs and zero-days are found using Unicorn, and the tools that are
built over it: the most common practice these days is to use fuzzing12.
1.1.3 WSL
Windows Subsystem for Linux (WSL) is a compatibility layer for run-
ning Linux binary executables (in ELF format) natively on Windows 10 and
Windows Server 2019. The first release of WSL provides a Linux-compatible
kernel interface developed by Microsoft, containing no Linux kernel code13
which can then run a GNU user space on top of it, like Ubuntu or Debian.
Such a user space might contain a bash shell and command language, with
native GNU command-line tools, programming-language interpreters, and
even graphical applications.
In May 2019, WSL 2 was announced, introducing important changes such as
a real Linux kernel, through a subset of Hyper-V features14.
1.2 Malware Analysis
1.2.1 Dynamic Analysis
Dynamic analysis is the technique to execute the malware and analyse its
behavior during run time. A good practice is not to run the malware directly
12https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/software-testing/
cc162782(v=msdn.10) (visited on 18/05/20)




to avoid any harm caused by it, so some steps to isolate the effects of the
malware must be made.
Commonly a sample is analysed inside a Virtual Machine, allowing the cre-
ation of an isolated environment where the malware can be analysed in almost
total security.
Many tools can be used to perform dynamic analysis: debuggers do the
work for a manual analysis, but more complex tools must be used to autom-
atize the process, like sandboxes. The description of what a sandbox is, how
to use it, and what it can provide to its users, is provided in section 1.3.
The main issue that is found during dynamic analysis, is that a smart mal-
ware is able to recognize to be analysed: it will change its behaviour and
signatures, making its study useless and misleading.
1.2.2 Static analysis
Static program analysis is the study of computer software that is per-
formed without actually execute the sample, avoiding its malicious effects on
the host machine.
There are an endless number of tools that can be used to perform static
analysis on a sample, like Ghidra15, IDA16 or BinaryNinja17.
It is possible to follow the execution flow of the sample, trying to understand
its nature, or it is possible to check precisely elements, like strings, system-
calls or Windows API, that can match a typical malware behaviour.
The main idea of static analysis is to understand the execution branches that
the sample can follow, obtaining an overview of what it is going to do, and
for which reason.
15https://github.com/NationalSecurityAgency/ghidra (visited on 21/06/20)
16https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/ (visited on 21/06/20)
17https://binary.ninja// (visited on 21/06/20)
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Signatures
As the two sections before tried to explain, many aspects of the sample
must be analysed before it is possible to understand if the target is a mal-
ware or not. Moreover, this study requires time, a resource that sometimes
analysts do not have. For these reasons, what it is commonly done, since
it is not possible to manually analyse every sample that is found, is to use
signatures. A signature encodes characteristics that distinguish a malware
from a genuine executable, and must be created before being able to use
them against a new target. For this reason it is still necessary to manually
analyse samples, obtaining new features that distinguish malwares, or even
characteristics that are present only in a precise malware family, recognizing
them.
Obviously this method can produce false positive and false negative, but
malware analysts are aware of that and precautions to lower these percentage
have been taken.
In fact each rule has a weight, which embodies the probability to correctly
indicate that the sample is a malware. The higher the weight, the higher the
probability that the target is a malware. Every rule that an analyst has in its
database can be matched against the same sample, increasing the probability
that the binary analysed is a malware: if the total weight exceed a threshold,
the target is considered malicious and a deeper study will be made.
Rules are commonly applied during static analysis against a sample, but
nothing stops to use them against the output of a dynamic analysis tool. At
the end, rules are matched using regular expressions, meaning that every
type of files can be matched.
The standard to create and share signatures is YaraRules18, and its made of
four components:
• A unique name to distinguish rules between them.
18https://github.com/Yara-Rules/rules
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• A meta section where the author, the weight and the references are
provided.
• A strings section, where the strings, or bytes, that describe a malware
behaviour are written.
• A condition section, where it is possible to specify constraints about
the strings section.
VirusTotal19 created the Yara-Python20 library, allowing the use of YARA
from a Python program, increasing the ease of use. The following is an
example of YaraRule that should match if the sample tries to disable the
host antivirus.
1 r u l e d i s a b l e a n t i v i r u s {
2 meta :
3 autho r = ” x0r ”
4 d e s c r i p t i o n = ” D i s a b l e An t iV i r u s ”
5 v e r s i o n = ”0.2”
6 s t r i n g s :
7 $p1 = ” So f tware \\Mic r o s o f t \\Windows\\ Cu r r e n tVe r s i o n \\
P o l i c i e s \\ Exp l o r e r \\Disa l l owRun ” nocase
8 $p2 = ” So f tware \\Mic r o s o f t \\Windows\\ Cu r r e n tVe r s i o n \\
Un i n s t a l l \\” nocase
9 $p3 = ”SOFTWARE\\ P o l i c i e s \\Mic r o s o f t \\Windows Defender ”
nocase
10 $c1 = ”RegSetValue ”
11 $ r1 = ” An t i V i r u sD i s a b l eN o t i f y ”
12 $ r2 = ” Don tR epo r t I n f e c t i o n I n f o rma t i o n ”
13 $ r3 = ”D i sab l eAnt iSpywa r e ”
14 $ r4 = ” Run I n v a l i d S i g n a t u r e s ”
15 $ r5 = ” An t i V i r u sOv e r r i d e ”
16 $ r6 = ”CheckExeS igna tu re s ”
17 $ f 1 = ” b l ackd . exe ” nocase
18 $ f 2 = ” b l a c k i c e . exe ” nocase
19 $ f 3 = ” lockdown . exe ” nocase
19https://www.virustotal.com/ (visited on 22/06/20)
20https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara-python (visited on 22/06/20)
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20 $ f 5 = ” t a s k k i l l . exe ” nocase
21 $ f 6 = ” t s k i l l . exe ” nocase
22 $ f 7 = ” s n i f f em . exe ” nocase
23 $ f 8 = ” z l c l i e n t . exe ” nocase
24 $ f 9 = ” zonea la rm . exe ” nocase
25 cond it ion :
26 ( $c1 and $p1 and 1 o f ( $ f ∗) ) or ( $c1 and $p2 ) or 1 o f (
$ r ∗) or $p3}
1.3 Sandbox
Sandbox is a traditional approach in which it is possible to execute files
in a self-governing virtual computerized technology excluding any physical
harm to the host machine. While running these files in sandbox, the sand-
box system can highlight malicious activities, such as modification entry in
registry, deleting and uploading files in a system[6]. Moreover, sandbox are
able to retrieve artifacts from the analysed sample: temporary files that it
creates, files deleted or modified, and even network traffic that it generates.
The artifacts are then saved and it is possible to separate them indepen-
dently, with different tools depending on the type of file.
A sandbox is the most common environment for analyse a malware, au-
tomating the analysis steps and producing a clear output about the predicted
maliciousness of the sample, and the artifacts that it generates. The detec-
tion is commonly done through rules: this methodology was explained in
section 1.2.2.
Many sandbox are available, some of them are open source, some are not.
The following sections describe only few of the open source freely available,




Cuckoo22 is the leading open source automated malware analysis system.
It can be used to analyze:
• Generic Windows executables
• DLL files
• Microsoft Office documents
• PDF documents
• URLs and HTML files
• Almost every other possible attack vectors
Figure 1.1: Cuckoo architecture
Its architecture is shown in figure 1.1, and it is made by two parts primary:
the host that manages the guests virtual machines and is in charge of post
22https://github.com/cuckoosandbox/cuckoo
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execution analysis, and many guest machines that are responsible to execute
the samples that the host sends, storing every artifact that was possible to
retrieve.
Cuckoo provides a huge number of rest API that can be used to submit and






Cuckoo analysis is split in two parts: the creation of the artifacts, and the
analysis of them. The former is done by Cuckoo itself, thanks to the many
different plugins that are installed:procmemdump, for example, is on them
that, if enabled, dumps the entire memory of the process.
But Cuckoo does not manage the sample analysis itself: it uses external tools
that must be installed in and executed into the host. Oletools23, for example,
is used to analyse .doc files, Wireshark24 to find information inside .pcap, a
memory dump is analysed using Volatility25, a binary or text file with YARA,
and so on.
This explains why Cuckoo setup and maintenance require an entire team:
• Every guest OS that may be used, must be installed and configured.
• Every guest software that will be used to execute the many different
samples must be installed, remembering to install different versions for
compatibility.
23https://github.com/decalage2/oletools (visited on 23/06/20)
24https://www.wireshark.org/develop.html (visited on 23/06/20)
25https://github.com/volatilityfoundation/volatility (visited on 23/06/20)
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• Every host analysis tool must be installed, with probably many versions
for each one, to keep compatibility.
• It is necessary to configure the network routing both between the host
machine and the company infrastructure, and between the host and
the many guests.
• Script everything!
For these reasons, Cuckoo requires more than a single person to run correctly,
and many figures that are needed are sysadmin and programmers, not even
malware analysts.
Moreover, if the OS environment that was created is not sufficient, meaning
that the target analysed must be run against a different OS, with a different
environment, it is necessary to rebuild and reconfigure from scratch the OS
image. This operation requires time, probably a significant amount of time,
that is not possible to have at all during a malware infection that is taking
place.
Written in Python2, the idea to switch to Python3 started in 201526 but was
never realized. For this reason, it is hard that new people and companies
will invest their time, and money, in a tool that uses a language that is not
longer supported. Of course there is an exception, and a Dutch company,
called hatching27 has participated for years in the development of Cuckoo:
their main sell is to customize a Cuckoo instance, built over the client needs.
1.3.2 Drakvuf
Drakvuf28is a virtualization based agentless black-box binary analysis sys-
tem, allowing in-depth execution tracing of arbitrary binaries (including op-
erating systems), all without having to install any special software within the
26https://github.com/cuckoosandbox/cuckoo/issues/594 (visited on 23/06/20)
27https://hatching.io/
28https://drakvuf.com/ (visited on 24/06/20)
1.3 Sandbox 13
virtual machine used for analysis.
It currently supports the following guests OS:
• Windows 7-8, both 32-bit and 64-bit
• Windows 10 64-bit
• Linux 2.6.x - 5.x, both 32-bit and 64-bit
The main feature of Drakvuf is its almost undetectable footprint from the
target point of view, allowing its use for malware analysis.
Its stealthiness is required because, as dynamic malware analysis systems
have become widely deployed, malware has evolved to detect and evade such
systems by either refusing to execute in a sandboxed environment, or by
modifying its runtime behavior to lead the analysis system astray[9].
Figure 1.2: Drakvuf architecture
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Drakvuf architecture is similar to Cuckoo, as shown in figure 1.2, the
main difference is that Drakvuf is implemented with the use of virtualiza-
tion technology, in particular it is built on the open-source Xen VM29, as
virtualization provides several benefits that dynamic malware analysis can
take advantage of: this provide external access to the state of the virtualized
hardware components, commonly referred to as virtual machine introspec-
tion (VMI), increasing the effectiveness of the analysis.
Drakvuf ability to hide itself from being detected by the target is done
through the capacity to inject the target process inside another process run-
ning inside the guest, without the aid of any in-guest helper.
Moreover, this sandbox offers deep monitoring functionalities:
• Execution tracing: Drakvuf is able to trace not only windows API,
but also kernel calls, by directly trapping internal kernel functions via
breakpoints injection, allowing to monitor malicious drivers as well as
rootkits. To establish a map of internal kernel functions, the Rekall30
forensics tool has been used.
• Monitoring file system accesses with memory events: When a
file is accessed, either by the OS or by a user-land process, a FILE OBJECT
is allocated within the kernel heap with the accompanying tag, Fil\xe5.
This allows Drakvuf to determine the full path of the file as well as the
access privilege with which the file is accessed without the need to have
any deeper understanding of the file system itself.
• Carving deleted files from memory: When files are created and de-
stroyed rapidly, as it is often the case when malware is being dropped on
a system, the files are never written to disk. In Drakvuf, the carving of
deleted files is implemented by intercepting specific internal kernel calls
that are responsible for file deletion, such as the NtSetInformationFile
and ZwSetInformationFile routines.
29https://xenproject.org/ (visited on 24/06/20)
30http://www.rekall-forensic.com/ (visited on 24/06/20)
Chapter 2
Qiling
Qiling1 is an emulation framework that it is in an active state of devel-
opment since October 2019, made by the same team that worked on the
creation of Unicorn Engine.
Its main features are the following:
• Cross platform: Windows, MacOS, Linux, BSD
• Cross architecture: X86, X86 64, Arm, Arm64, Mips
• Multiple file formats: PE, MachO, ELF
• Emulate and sandbox machine code in a isolated environment
• Support cross architecture and platform debugging capabilities
• Provide high level API to setup and configure the sandbox
• Fine-grain instrumentation: allow hooks at various levels (instruction/basic-
block/memory-access/exception/syscall/IO/etc)
• Allow dynamic hotpatch on-the-fly running code, including the loaded
library
1https://github.com/qilingframework/qiling (visited on 10/06/20)
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• True framework in Python, making it easy to build customized security
analysis tools on top
Qiling is interesting because it tries to merge together the concepts of em-
ulation and, partially, of a sandbox. Unicorn Engine is in charge of the
emulation of the sample and, at the same time, is the core of Qiling. Like a
sandbox needs an operating system environment before being able to execute
the target binary, Qiling is able to build the environment without requiring
any kind of software installation. Commonly, executables gain the knowledge
of the external world thanks to systemcalls, if the sample is a Unix file, or
via Windows Api, in the case of a Portable Executable file. Both the com-
munication ways are emulated inside Qiling, allowing to control and monitor
every aspect of the interaction between the target and its environment.
Qiling is not an analysis tool, but is a framework, designed to allow the con-
struction of tools over it: storing every information that a possible tool may
need, Qiling is the perfect foundation to build dynamic analysis tool, or to
reproduce the concept of sandbox inside the emulation paradigm.
2.1 Comparisons
Qiling is the next step of the emulation paradigm, since it will emulate an
entire operating system, something that was not possible before this project.
It is necessary to consider the pros and cons of this framework, compared
to other emulating projects or sandboxes, to understand if the Qiling idea is
needed.
2.1.1 Cuckoo
As described in section 1.3.1, Cuckoo requires an enormous team work for
its maintenance, that Qiling does not need. It is easy to change the config-
uration parameters of the emulation and the environment that sample must
be run in, like OS variables and even hardware components.
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But, while Cuckoo is able to test a multitude of attack vectors, like .pdf,
.doc files, Qiling is able to emulate only executable files.
The installation of Qiling is literally done through a single command, pip
install --user qiling, while Cuckoo requires a specific host configura-
tion, making it a lot easier to install and deploy.
It is necessary to remember that Qiling is an emulation framework, not de-
signed to be a malware analysis tool, nor a sandbox. For this reason, it is not
able to produce an output of the goodness of the target, opposed to Cuckoo.
2.1.2 Unicorn Engine
While Unicorn Engine is able to emulate only CPU instructions, it is
not able to understand high level concepts such as dynamic libraries, system
calls, I/O handling or executable formats like PE, MachO or ELF. Qiling
goal and design is to overcome this restrictions, allowing the emulation of an
entire executable, but at the same time, keeping the ability to have fine-grain
instrumentation.
2.1.3 QEMU
QEMU in user mode is able to emulate every Linux and BSD executable
from a Unix host. For example it does not allow to emulate natively a
Portable Executable file, like Qiling is able to.
Technically it is possible to use QEMU to emulate the entire Windows OS,
then run the sample inside that emulation, and check the result, using the
system mode that was described in section 2.1.3. There are many issues in
that solution:
• It is not possible to retrieve information of what is happening inside
the emulated OS, having zero visibility of the sample behaviour
• It is not possible to hook systemcall or modify the OS environment
runtime
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• It is necessary to install and configure entire OS
2.1.4 Usercorn
Usercorn2 is very similar to Qiling as final goal: trying to emulate a
complex environment but still allowing to have fine-grain instrumentation.
Like Qiling, it is a framework, but the problem is that its scope is limited
to emulate only Linux binaries, and since the vast majority of malwares are
Windows PE, its use is too much limited for being used in a production
environment.
2.1.5 Binee
Binee3 is a tool written in Go by CarbonBlack. Its goal is similar to
Qiling’s one: the emulation of binaries, with a focus on introspection of all
IO operations. Its primary feature is to provide a flexible environment for
determining side effects on the system made by the sample. The issue is
that it is able to emulate only Windows sample, limiting, like Usercorn, the
numbers of sample that can be analysed.
Moreover, its Windows support is not fully implemented yet: the number
of Windows API implemented are the same as the one implemented inside
Qiling. For these reasons it is hard to find a real use case.
2https://github.com/lunixbochs/usercorn (visited on 26/06/20)
3https://github.com/carbonblack/binee (visited on 26/06/20)
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2.2 Architecture
The architecture of Qiling is articulated, complex and undocumented:
only the source code describes the real story of this project, and the docu-
mentation is still under development.
Figure 2.1: Qiling architecture [11]
Figure 2.1 shows how Qiling is structured from an high point of view.
The concept is simple: the executable file, whatever kind it is, is loaded
inside Qiling, and a general setup is started. Then the systemcalls or API
are hooked, meaning that when the executable will call a function, a Qiling
implementation will be called. At this point it is possible to connect instru-
mentation hooks, giving to its users the control. Finally a post process file
is created, containing the information retrieved during the emulation.
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Figure 2.2: Qiling core class architecture
The class Core is the main class of the framework, and its task is to create
the Qiling object and load inside its components, as figure 2.2 shows.
Each component is an abstract class that will have many, different imple-
mentations, depending on the OS that must be emulated, the hardware that
should be used, and the type of executable that is given as input.
Figure 2.3: Qiling loader class architecture
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The Loader task is to, as its name explains, load every information about
the binary in memory. Figure 2.3 shows the classes that Qiling implements
for doing that, each one tasked to load a different type of binary: the class
PE will load a Portable Executable file, the Macho a macOs file, and so on.
Moreover it is necessary to load libraries, that will change depending on the
executable, basic structures that must be already in the memory, the argu-
ments, and more.
Figure 2.4: Qiling os class architecture
The second core component of Qiling, is the Os abstract class, imple-
mented by many different objects, as shown in figure 2.4. Each class is a
different operating system that Qiling supports, allowing its emulation to
some degrees.
These classes are tasked to the setup and the hook of systemcalls, or Win-
dows API, and right now Qiling implements 20% of the functions inside
Kernel32.dll and 30% for Unix systemcalls. Another concept that every Os
class must implement, is the multi threading, and, in the case of the Win-
dows object, the registries and handle manager.
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Figure 2.5: Qiling arch class architecture
The last core component is the Arch abstract class. Not only it is nec-
essary to emulate different operating system, but even different family of in-
struction set architectures: figure 2.5 shows which architectures are available
at the moment inside Qiling. Their task is to properly create, set and modify
the registries that Unicorn Engine will use for the emulation, to manage the
stack and the segments that the emulator needs.
2.3 Usage
Since Qiling is a Python framework, its basic usage is to import it as a
package, and use the Qiling object with its parameters configurable during
the object creation. The main function is run(), that, as the name denotes,
starts the emulation. The sample is loaded in the memory, the shared li-
braries are loaded, and the emulation is run until the end of the execution.
What was described is the basic usage of Qiling, but normally its users want
the possibility to have instrumentation.
For doing that, Qiling offers hooks at different levels, giving the possibility
to add a user defined callback that works with the entire Qiling object.
• hook address when the program counter is at the defined address,
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the user defined function will be executed.
• hook mem read every time a read in memory is performed, the user
defined function will be executed.
• hook mem write every time a write in memory is performed, the user
defined function will be executed.
• hook code before every instruction, the user defined function is exe-
cuted.
• set syscall a Qiling systemcall is replaced by the user defined function.
• set api a Qiling Windows API is replaced by the user defined function.
When the emulation is completed, a log file is saved and it is possible to
retrieve the log file created by Qiling, containing every library loaded, every
Windows APIs (or systemcalls) called with its parameters. The following
snippet shows what was described before, hooking a specific address to stop
the emulation and printing the log file. 
1 import qiling
2 def stop ( ql , default_values ) :
3 print ( "Ok for now" )
4 ql . emu_stop ( )
5 if __name__ == "__main__" :
6 ql = Qiling ( [ "../ examples/rootfs/x86_windows/bin/GandCrab502.bin" ] , "../
examples/rootfs/x86_windows" , output="debug" , profile="profiles/
windows_administrator.ql" )
7 ql . hook_address ( stop , 0x40860f )
8 ql . run ( )
9 print ( open ( "../ examples/rootfs/x86_windows/GandCrab502.log" ) . read ( ) ) 
2.4 Issues
Three main issues were found on the study of Qiling:
• A lack of operating system functions implemented : only 30% of Unix
systemcalls have been implemented, and Windows APIs percentages
are even lower.
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• A configuration file is missing, meaning that an end user does not have
the possibility to change the parameters of the emulation, or the OS
environment.
• A way to save the results obtained through the sample emulation inside
the Qiling object, as a real framework must do, removing the necessity
to the final user to parse the log file.
2.5 Results
Qiling has been tested only in an academic environment, meaning that
the binaries where not complicated, very linear and the majority were made
by the same people that developed Qiling. A real malware was partially
emulated, the famous ransomware WannaCry4 , but only the first section,
since it is not possible to use Qiling to make post and get requests.
When Qiling was tested with real word Windows malwares, the results were
not satisfying enough: almost 99% of the tested sample crashed, and the
number of APIs called is very low. The main cause of crashes is simply that
not every Windows APIs have been implemented inside Qiling, making it
impossible to continue the emulation of the binary target. There are some
cases where Qiling does not correctly behave like it is supposed to, since






Dragonfly is a tool that merges together the concepts of sandbox and em-
ulation. Built over Qiling, its goal is to detect if a particular sample is a
malware or is safe to execute.
Inspired by YARA, the detection is done through rules that encode a ma-
licious behaviour into a signature. Thanks to the emulation, it’s possible,
for example, to verify the goodness of a Portable Executable file from a Unix
machine, a Macho executable from a Windows computer, and so on. With
Qiling’s power, the rules can be deep and precise as one wishes: it’s possible
to create signatures using strings, systemcalls or Windows API. It is possible
to set watch points at any address, check if a Dll has been loaded or not, or
if a Windows registry has been accessed.
Moreover, Dragonfly rules are matched during the emulation: signatures
have the possibility to execute custom made functions, actions, when a match
is found, empowering the rules to the next level.
Qiling, before this project, was designed to be only an emulation frame-
work and the malware analysis was out of its scope. For this reason, a good
part of the project was to design and implement the necessary changes inside




Figure 3.1: Dragonfly’s class diagram
The architecture of Dragonfly is quite simple: everything was designed
and built around Qiling. Figure 3.1 describes how each class is connected
to the others. It’s understandable that the fulcrum of Dragonfly is the Core
class: its main task is to run the emulation of the sample, using Qiling as a
library.
It’s possible to split the diagram in two parts: the left side, composed of
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Report Manager, Report and Function Report have the task to retrieve
and store information about what happened during the emulation: which
systemcall or Windows API has been called, which registry has been ac-
cessed, strings used and so on. In this way it is possible to standardize the
information that Qiling has split inside many classes.
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Figure 3.2: Dragonfly’s rule implementation
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The right part instead has, as its fulcrum, the Rule class. This object is
made of many Module. The module is an abstract class that is implemented
in seven different way, as figure 3.2 shows. Each module has to implement
the function check(Report report, int clock), where it is tasked to com-
pute if the module matches with the report in input. All the other checks
are done by the abstract class, removing complexity in each implementation,
and allowing the project to scale in case that new modules are created.
A deeper description of how the rules work is presented in section 3.3.
3.2 Qiling for malware analysis
Qiling was not ready to emulate any kind of malwares when Dragonfly
was designed, as already described in section 2.4. But Qiling was not alone
in this issue: there was not any emulator that was able to manage a real
malware and, at the same time, provide enough API and hooks to retrieve
enough information allowing the creation of a tool on top of it.
For this reason, it was decided to help the Qiling community with the devel-
opment of this framework, keeping in mind that the goal was to allow the
emulation of complicated malwares. Since Dragonfly is designed to mainly
work with Windows samples, since the majority of malwares are designed
to work in a Windows environment, it has been decided to focus especially
on the Windows section of Qiling. Three are the main concepts that Qiling
did not have, as already described in 2.4, and each following section tries to
describe how each issue was solved.
3.2.1 API
There was an enormous lack of Windows API implemented inside Qiling.
This absence was justified by the small developers team: they had to focus
their energies in others, more important, issues, like manage multithreading
and make every different OS work, having the same foundations.
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For that reason, at the beginning, the work done on Qiling was focused on
implementing enough API to be able to execute malwares, and on learn-
ing how Qiling is designed and how it was possible to contribute in more
meaningful ways. Moreover, since malwares are infamously known for using
deprecated functions, with strong side effects, and even undocumented ones,
this development took more time than anticipated.
At the time of writing, it is possible to claim that 40%-45% of kernel32.dll is
implemented, and many other Dlls are partially reproduced inside Qiling.
3.2.2 Profiles
The first profile created was made for Windows in the early stage of the
Qiling upgrade.
Now, profiles are one of the many features that the framework is proud to
offer to its users. The concept is nothing more than a configuration file. It
stores every information that the emulation may use, for example, the start-
ing address of the stack, the address of where sample is loaded in memory or
where each Dll should be loaded and so on.
But the profile can store much more than emulation variables: the config-
uration of each entire operating system is saved in this way. It is possible
to describe which version of Windows should be emulated, its username and
computer name, the machine IP address, and with which permission the sam-
ple should be executed. Every hardware specification that Qiling currently
supports, like the number of processors or the drives and disks connected to
the host, are set through the profile.
Every single of these variables can be easily replaced, added or removed, mak-
ing possible to emulate the same sample in many, different, environments, as
the situation requires.
From this configuration file, it is even possible to replace or add new Win-
dows registry entries: the main goal was to give to the users an easy, quick
and powerful way to manipulate the host environment as they please.
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This upgrade solves the most important issue of the sandbox: it is now
easy to change the environment and it is not needed to install and configure
an entire OS.
The following snippet is an example of Windows profile that was made.
1 [OS64]
2 heap_address = 0x500000000
3 heap_size = 0x5000000
4 stack_address = 0x7ffffffde000
5 stack_size = 0x40000
6 image_address = 0x400000
7 dll_address = 0x7ffff0000000
8 entry_point = 0x140000000
9 [OS32]
10 heap_address = 0x5000000
11 heap_size = 0x5000000
12 stack_address = 0xfffdd000
13 stack_size = 0x21000
14 image_address = 0x400000
15 dll_address = 0x10000000
16 entry_point = 0x40000
17 [SHELLCODER]
18 # ram_size 0xa00000 is 10MB
19 ram_size = 0xa00000
20 entry_point = 0x1000000
21 [KERNEL]
22 pid = 1996
23 parent_pid = 0
24 shell_pid = 10
25 [LOG]
26 # log directory output
27 # usage: dir = qlog
28 dir =
29 # split log file, use with multithread
30 split = False
31 [MISC]
32 # append string into different logs
32 3. Dragonfly
33 # maily for multiple times Ql run with one file
34 # usage: append = test1
35 append =
36 automatize_input = False
37 [SYSTEM]
38 # Major Minor ProductType
39 majorVersion = 10
40 minorVersion = 0
41 productType = 1
42 language = 1093
43 VER_SERVICEPACKMAJOR = 0
44 computername = qilingpc
45 permission = root
46 [PROCESSES]
47 # process active in our env -> pid
48 csrss . exe = 1239
49 [USER]
50 username = Qiling
51 language = 1093
52 [PATH]
53 systemdrive = C :\
54 windir = Windows\
55 [REGISTRY]
56 registry_diff = registry_diff . json
57 [HARDWARE]
58 number_processors = 5
59 [VOLUME]
60 name = Volume1
61 serial_number = 3224010732
62 type = NTFS
63 sectors_per_cluster = 10
64 bytes_per_sector = 512
65 number_of_free_clusters = 12345
66 number_of_clusters = 65536
67 [NETWORK]
68 dns_response_ip = 10 . 2 0 . 3 0 . 4 0
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3.2.3 Storing information
Qiling is a framework, but to learn about what happened during the emu-
lation, API called, registries accessed, files created, it was necessary to parse
its output file. This was a big issue: a framework must provide every infor-
mation about its internal state to its users, using the object itself.
For this reason, it was developed a way to store every information that can
be useful to an analyst inside the Qiling class: every string that has been
used, read, or written in any part of the the memory; each systemcall called
with its own parameters, address, and return value; the name of every Dll
loaded and every registry that has been accessed.
3.2.4 Results
After these upgrades, it was possible to carry out a batch emulation with
Qiling : 100 malwares have been emulated, unfortunately all Portable Ex-
ecutable files and all retrieved from a unclassified data set, demonstrating
how Qiling behaviour improved from what was described in section 2.5.
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Figure 3.3: Number of Win-
dows API called
Figure 3.4: Number of unique
Windows API called
Figure 3.3 represents the total number of Windows API that a sample
called during the emulation. The numbers sometimes are really high, even
after having considered the low number of unique API that figure 3.4 shows.
This happens because Qiling has to emulate the memory management too,
done through API and normally transparent to the programmer. Every time
the sample creates a variable, for Qiling and the operating system, is in
reality just allocating memory. In reality is calling a kernel API that will
manage the heap allocation, increasing exponentially the total numbers of
calls
Figure 3.4 shows the numbers of unique Windows API that each sample
calls: the values are statistically too low to had an entire execution of a mal-
ware, since a real binary normally ends its execution after an average of 100
unique systemcall, while the mean value of the samples analysed is 25. More-
over, a high number of samples does not even start their emulation, and this is
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caused mainly by the fact that Qiling does not support .NET executables yet.
Figure 3.5: Number of samples that crashed during the emulation
For last, figure 3.5 describes how many samples crashed during the em-
ulation. The numbers seems not very satisfying, but it is important to re-
member that it is not necessary to emulate everything. If the emulation can
last enough to understand the sample behaviour, Qiling has correctly done
its work, even if the emulation crashes.
.
3.3 Rules
The rules are the only way to use Dragonfly to identify if the sample
analysed is a malware . This idea was used for the first time with the YARA
project, that provides a rule-based approach to create descriptions of mal-
ware families, based on textual or binary patterns.
36 3. Dragonfly
Why Dragonfly doesn’t support YARA? Why was necessary to create another
way to create rules? These are probably the questions that comes through
the reader mind. The answer is, quite simple to grasp: YARA is not powerful
enough.
Thanks to the emulation, people can create deeper and more precise rules:
it is possible to check if a sample tries to access, in reading or writing
mode, an interesting structure saved somewhere in memory, for example
the ProcessEnvironmentBlock (PEB)1 or the ThreadEnvironmentBlock
(TEB)2 inside a Windows environment. What YARA does, is just match the
regex expressions that the user defines with the static sample, and checks
if are present inside the binary. What Dragonfly tries to accomplish is to
categorize every type of information that can be used to identify a malware.
Moreover, Dragonfly can be used to call user defined functions, or actions,
as they are called inside this project: to have an unique and consistent syn-
tax, it was decided to create another way to write and use rules, distancing
Dragonfly from YARA.
An action is an user defined function that is called when a rule matches.
This concept is very powerful: it is possible to create an action that dumps
the entire sample memory, an action that can retrieve values from the reg-
istries or memory structures, an action for anything that the user may be
interested in. The user defined action has two parameters, the Qiling object,
allowing the full control of the emulation from inside the function, and a dic-
tionary, containing the variables and their respective values that were found
during the emulation.
Inside a Dragonfly rule there are keywords that the user must use. Those
that have the symbol * after the keywords means that are mandatory and






• Name* unique identifier of the rule.
• Meta a dictionary containing information about the author, the de-
scription of the rule, and every information that may be interesting.
• Modules* a list of modules, each one represented as a dictionary. More
information about every module available inside Dragonfly in section
3.3.1.
• Weight* every rule has a weight indicating how much the signature
reflects a malware behaviour.
• Condition* it can be Any or All, indicating if the rule should trigger
when just one of the module matches, or if every module matches.
• Order a Boolean value that describes if the modules should match in
order or not.
• Actions a list of functions names that will be called when the rule is
matched.
• Variables a list of variables that are possible to use inside the modules.
Inside appendix A.0.1 it is possible to retrieve the rules that were made as
examples, to better understand these concepts.
3.3.1 Modules
Every rule is made by at least one module, each one is independent from
the other and the functionalities that it exports are provided via keywords.
When writing a rule, the module is nothing more than a dictionary, where
the value of the key module describes which type of module made inside
Dragonfly the user wants to use.
The following sections describe the functionality of the modules present in
Dragonfly, their keywords and their use.
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Module - WatchPoint
A watch point is a specific address that needs to be monitored. A use case
is malwares that try to retrieve the value of the parameter DebuggingFlags
inside the PEB to understand if they are debugged or not.
Since the address of these types of structures can not be known before start-
ing the emulation, the WatchPoint module provides the feature of directly
inserting the name of the structure that should be monitored and, if neces-
sary, an offset from its base address. Another example of structure that can
be interesting to monitor is the TEB.
The following keys, and consequently, the following features are provided:
• Address* the address that, when accessed, triggers the module.
• Structure* the structure that should be checked. It is used to retrieve
dynamically the address, since it is not possible to know its address
statically.
• Offset an integer indicating the distance from the address of the se-
lected structure.
• Size an integer indicating the range of address to monitor from the
base address.
• Type* it can be Write or Read, indicating if the module should match
when the address (or range of addresses) is accessed in write or read
mode.
The key offset can be used only if the key structure has been used too, while
it is not possible to have both the keys structure and address.
Module - Registry
It is possible to use this module only if the binary analysed is a Portable
Executable for an obvious reason: only Windows implements the concept of
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a system registry. A Macho or Unix file will not check these values because
their operating system does not support it.
The Registry module matches when a specific registry key has been accessed
and, if the user desires more precision, when the value specified has been
queried.
A use case is malwares that try to use registries to identify if they are ex-
ecuted in a controlled environment, like a sandbox: for example the key
SOFTWARE\VMware, Inc.\VMware Tools is present only if Vmware is in-
stalled.
Another example are malwares that will add themselves in the key
HKEY LOCAL MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce
to execute their malicious payload at every boot of the host.
The following keys, and consequently, the following features are provided:
• Key* the registry key that, if accessed, matches with the module.
• Value Name a string describes which of the many values contained
inside a key must be queried to match with the module.
Module - Api
The common way to understand the behaviour of a sample, is through
its APIs calls: they can give powerful insights to the analyst that is able to
correctly read them and understand what is going on.
A simple use case: if the sample is calling the Windows API CreateToolhelp32Snapshot
with parameter dwFlags the value TH32CS SNAPPROCESS, it means that it is
trying to enumerate every process in the entire system. There are very few
legit motivation for doing so.
For this reason the module Api was created, leaving to its users the power
of specifying with high granularity and precision when the module should
match, allowing even to check the parameters and the return value of the
API called.
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• Syscall* which API should be matched against.
• Return Value an array containing the possible return values that
make the module match.
• Params parameters of the API as a dictionary. Each key is the name
of the parameter and each value is an array containing one or more
possible values that will make the module match.
Module - Dll
Another module that was designed to work against a Portable Executable
file, since only Windows use the concept of Dll.
A use case are malwares that tries to learn more about the environment,
checking if a specific Dll was loaded or not: this happens because some
debugger, virtual machine and sandboxes will require the installation of par-
ticular Dlls. If the sample will try to load these, it means that is trying to
understand if some debug tools are present in the host machine.
• Dll* name of the Dll that must be loaded to match the module
Module - SubRule
This module has, as its goal, the increase of expressive power of rules.
Creating a rule that, has as one of its module, the SubRule module, allows
to concatenate rules together and rule reusability.
• Rule* name of rule that must have matched.
Module - String
Another technique that can be used to identify and categorize malwares is
through hard-coded and unique strings that are present in the file or, during
the execution, in their memory.
The module String has the goal to match when a particular string, or even
raw bytes, are found. It is possible to search the entire memory, or the static
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file, or to use the strings that are used as parameters during the calls of APIs
or systemcalls.
• Input* the string, or an array of bytes, that must be present in the
sample.
• Case Boolean value, if true the case is relevant, otherwise it is not.
• Memory Boolean value, if true the entire memory is relevant, other-
wise it is not.
Module - Mnemonic
This module is a surplus, meaning that its scope is covered by the String
module: a mnemonic in fact is the human way to represent opcodes, that are
nothing more than simply bytes.
The module Mnemonic was made to find specific opcodes inside the sample,
with a focus on the possibility that malware will use shellcodes to obfuscate
their behaviour.
The mnemonics can be given in whatever instruction set the maker prefers:
thanks to keystone-engine3 they will be translated to the instruction set
that the target was made for.
• Instructions* an array of mnemonic instructions that if executed, will
make the module match.
• Static Boolean value, if true the module matches if the instructions
are present, if false only if are executed.
3.3.2 Variables
How to use variables inside the rules, and why this feature even exists can
not be very immediate: the usage is made of two parts, firstly it is necessary
to declare the variables that are going to be used inside the rule, then it is
3https://www.keystone-engine.org/ (visited on 29/06/20)
42 3. Dragonfly
possible to use them inside every module that the rule is made of.
When a module has a variable as one of its parameter, the module matches
if all other constraints are respected. Once a match is found, the value of
the parameter is assigned to the variable, and the emulation continues. The
rule in its entirety matches if, every module that it is made of, that shares
the same variables, has at least one value in common.
3.3.3 Json-schema
The reader can understand that it will be easy to insert a wrong type in
one of the many parameters that the modules support. A wrong type will
possibly make Dragonfly crash or, even worse, have an unexpected behaviour.
To limit this issue it has been decided to use json-schema4, allowing to specify
the type of each parameter in each module. The typing must be done by the
module maker, defining a schema if new modules are added to Dragonfly,
and two are the main benefits of this library:
• The module must behave consistently only with the types defined in
its schema.
• Dragonfly will not have an unexpected behaviour in case of a wrong
type.
• A Dragonfly user will have a clear exception, where the motivations of
the typing error is reported.
Each schema that has been made for each module is provided in appendix
B.
3.4 Usage
Dragonfly was born to be used as a Python package. This means that
its users can simply import Dragonfly inside its own project, instantiate the
4https://python-jsonschema.readthedocs.io/en/stable/ (visited on 29/06/20)
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object, and run the analysis with the method run(). It is necessary to discuss
how it is possible to configure the Dragonfly object and how many types of
analysis exists and how they work.
Three are the possible levels that can be set when the run() function is
called:
• Level 0 will emulate the sample and a single analysis is done at the
end of the emulation. It is the faster analysis and it does not support
the use of actions.
• Level 1 will create a report at every step and each module is matched
with the new section. When an entire rule matches, its actions are
called sequentially. A step is made every time a Windows API, or
systemcalls, is called. It is possible to not increase the step, black
listing specific functions.
• Level 2 will make a level 1 analysis, plus it will try to defeat anti-debug
techniques that a sample can adopt. This level is still in development,
and more information are provided in section 4.2.3.
The run() method will return a JSON object, if the parameter json is set
to True. The user can even retrieve every bit of information about the rules
that matched, setting the parameter verbose to True, otherwise a Boolean
value, describing if Dragonfly thinks that the sample is a malware or not, is
returned.
The Dragonfly object is customizable in many ways:
• Every parameter that Qiling requires during the object creation, is set
at the creation of Dragonfly
• Hooks and Patches, to modify directly the sample behaviour
• ignore syscalls a list of systemcalls, or Windows API that, when
called, will not produce a partial report to analyse.
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• max malice an integer describing the threshold after which the sample
is considered a malware. Each rule matched will increase the malice of
the sample.
• rules path the path of the rules directory.
3.4.1 Flow
Figure 3.6: Dragonfly’s analysis flow
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Figure 3.7: Dragonfly’s analysis flow
Figure 3.6 and figure 3.7 show how the analysis of a Windows sample
inside Dragonfly is really done, which components are made and how they
communicate with each other. The figures describe an analysis of level 1:
the difference with a level 0 analysis is that the lower level does not support
actions and rules are matched at the end of the entire emulation, not at every
step.
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Before starting the emulation, the rules are loaded inside Dragonfly and the
Qiling setup is started, applying hooks and patches that the user could have
set and loading the libraries that the sample and the Dlls that it requires,
into in its own memory.
After that Dragonfly will hook every Windows API on exit, meaning that a
custom function will be called after the execution of a Windows API. The
custom function will create the report and find rules that matches. It is
possible to ignore some API using the parameter ignore syscalls. The
partial report, contains every bit of information that Dragonfly will use to
find modules that match. When every module of a rule is matched, the rule
itself matches, and their actions are executed, handing over the execution to
the user.
At the end end, an output is generated, containing the analysis results.
Chapter 4
Results and Future Work
4.1 Testing
Dragonfly percentage to be able to correctly detect if the sample analysed
is a malware, requires the maximum number of information at its disposal.
An issue appears when its core, Qiling, is not able to emulate the sample.
The problems present in the framework were explained in section 2.4.
Having said that, two samples have been deeply analysed, using before
a manual approach, and then with Dragonfly: Gandcrab1 and Al-Khaser2.
The former is a famous ransomware, the latter is a proof of concept malware
that aims to stress an anti-malware system, checking if the sandbox is forti-
fied and stealthy enough to bypass the checks that it makes.
These two samples are interesting because, Al-Khaser can be used to trans-
late its checks in Dragonfly rules, while Gandcrab can be used to create new
rules, to understand if the rules implemented are enough to detect a malware,
and which artifacts it is possible to be extracted.
1https://www.vmray.com/cyber-security-blog/gandcrab-ransomware-evolution-analysis
(visited on 29/06/20)
2https://github.com/LordNoteworthy/al-khaser (visited on 29/06/20)
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4.1.1 Al-Khaser
Al-Khaser is a proof of concept malware application with good intentions
that aims to stress an anti-malware system. It performs many common
malware tricks with the goal of seeing if the system stays under the radar.







Only the anti-debugging attacks have been encoded as rules, of the many
possible tricks that Al-Khaser implements: since these checks can be very pre-
cise, utilizing not common Windows structures and API with uncommon side
effects, Qiling still has issues to emulate the entirety of Al-Khaser. Among
these checks, half are simply done through Windows APIs, and thanks to the
module Api, the encoding in rules is trivial.
The PEB tricks are more interesting: these can be hard to be detected
with a naive sandbox, or with a manual analysis. The WatchPoint module
comes to help in this scenario, allowing to watch the entire structure and
learn which of the many information contained in the PEB, the sample tries
to query.
Inside the appendix A.0.3, some of the rules, that were made thanks to the
study of Al-Khaser, are described.
4.1 Testing 49
4.1.2 Gandcrab
Gandcrab has been studied a lot for this project and many rules have been
made thanks to the knowledge obtained through this ransomware: appendix
A.0.2 contains rules, that were made to recognize if a sample belongs to the
Gandcrab family, and also more general ones, that can be used to detect
malware behaviours.
Three are the main paths of the Gandcrab execution:
• Encrypt the file system if it was run with administrator privileges.
• Launch itself again with more privilege if it was run with user privileges.
• Stop the execution and cancel itself from the system if some system
constraints are not satisfied.
In any case, the first check that Gandcrab does is using the Windows API
CreateToolhelp32Snapshot to enumerate every process inside the host and
strcmpiW to compare the name of the process with an hard-coded list. If a
match is found, it will try to kill the process. This technique can be easily
detected thanks to Dragonfly, using, as a rule, two API modules, checking
first if CreateToolhelp32Snapshot is called, then strcmpiW adding, as pos-
sible values of the comparisons, common processes that are present inside
an host. Moreover, it is necessary to set the keywords condition to All and
order to True.
Gandcrab at this point will try to gain more knowledge about the system,
using VerifyVersionInfoW and GetTokenInformation to understand which
Windows version is the user using, and with which privilege Gandcrab has
been executed. The first Windows API has, as one of its parameter, the ad-
dress of a OsVersionInfoW3 structure. This object contains the information
about the operating system asked by the sample, and that must be compared
3https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winnt/
ns-winnt-osversioninfoexa (visited on 30/06/20)
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with what the host has installed. Thanks to a simple action, as shown in the
third rule in the appendix, it is possible to retrieve the entire structure from
the memory.
If the permissions are not sufficient to execute its real payload, meaning it
does not have administrator privileges, Gandcrab will call the Windows API
ShellExecute, with the parameter verb having value runas, and file to
run "C:\Windows\System32\wmic.exe", to which it passes the parameter
"process call create ’cmd /c start <GandcrabPath>’". This trick is
used to execute itself again, earning the administrator privilege. Obviously
the API ShellExecute should be monitored very closely.
Another operation that Gandcrab does is checking if the keyboard layout
or the user language in the host, is Russian. If this is the case, the ransomware
will deactivate itself using the API ShellExecute. It is possible to create a
rule that matches this behaviour, as showed in the second rule of the appendix
A.0.2, using the module Registry with key HKEY CURRENT USER\Keyboard
Layout\Preload. It is possible to try different keyboard layout modifying
the input profile, as section 3.2.2 described.
4.2 Future Developments
Both Dragonfly, and its core, Qiling, should keep improving their be-
haviour, the first to detect malwares, the latter to emulate them. Three are
the main points that have been identified that need to be polished, and the
following sections will try to explain and give a solution to each issue.
4.2.1 Rules
An aspect that in this work that was not considered enough, is the cre-
ation of new rules. Gandcrab and Al-Khaser have been used, yes, but it is
not enough to have a product that will correctly identify every malware that
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analyse.
The bare minimum is the translation of YARA rules to Dragonfly rules,
adding, where it is necessary, actions to use Dragonfly as the best of its ca-
pabilities.
A reminder that make rules is a business, and companies sell and distribute
them, making it a job that needs experience, a deep knowledge of malware
behaviours and reverse engineering abilities.
4.2.2 Modules
Dragonfly architecture was designed to support the creation of new mod-
ules, without having to learn the entire project. If it is found that a new
module is necessary to better describe a malware behaviour, its implemen-
tation should be easy.
The modules that Dragonfly has, are enough to describe the majority of be-
haviours, but they still need to be polished, or modified, as the knowledge of
how malware works increase.
An example of a module that is not implemented, because Qiling can’t sup-
port it yet, is the Connectivity module, that will identify the connections
with the command center.
4.2.3 Anti anti-evasion
The main concept that Dragonfly was not able implement is the analy-
sis level 2, or the anti anti-evasion level. This was though as an advanced
feature that should be used to try to defeat evasion techniques implemented
by malwares. When a malware detects that is in a controlled environment,
it will change its behaviour, or simply will stop its execution, making its
analysis quite useless. To detect when this happens, the idea was to use
Symbolic execution4, understanding the check that the sample implements,
and allowing to bypassing it changing the correct variable in the operating
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Symbolic_execution (visited on 30/06/20)
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system environment.
Conclusion
Dragonfly is a tool that merges together the concepts of dynamic analysis,
emulation and sandbox, increasing the knowledge of the sample behaviour.
Thanks to the emulation it is possible to have control of the emulation and
the entire operating system environment, making easy to customize and mod-
ify it.
Dragonfly is able to recognize and distinguish malwares through rules.
Rules, in turn, are made by modules. Differently from YARA, that simply
matches the user regex with the file selected, Dragonfly modules are designed
to have a limited scope and are matched against a precise type of information.
The module Registry is used to verify the accesses of the system registry, Api
with systemcalls and Windows API, Strings with the strings that are present
inside or used by the sample.
The emulation core is Qiling, and upgrades were necessary to allow the
emulation of malwares: the first profile was made in this work, allowing to
easily customize the operating system environment and even variables used
during the emulation itself. More Windows API have been implemented to
a considerable extent, and moreover it is not necessary to parse the log file
anymore to retrieve information about the emulation.
Two samples in particular have been used to build and test Dragonfly
rules: Gandcrab, and Al-Khaser. Thanks to them, it was possible to see how
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Dragonfly’s core, Qiling, behaves against real world examples, and it was
possible to create rules that synthesize the behaviour of the ransomware and
the checks of Al-Khaser.
Having said that, Dragonfly still requires some polish, many more signa-
tures must be made, and more modules should be made. Its core, Qiling, has
to improve its performance against complicated samples, allowing Dragonfly




1 {”name” : ”Example − Use o f modules ” ,
2 ”meta” : {
3 ” autho r ” : ”Oss igeno ” ,
4 ” d e s c r i p t i o n ” : ” D i f f e r e n t modules can be used t o g e t h e r ”
5 }
6 ”modules ” : [
7 {” s y s c a l l ” : ” V i r t u a l A l l o c ” ,
8 ”params : {
9 ” l pAdd r e s s ” : [ ” add r e s s ]
10 }
11 } ,
12 {” s t r u c t u r e ” : ”PEB” ,
13 ” o f f s e t ” : 2
14 } ,
15 {” r e g i s t r y ” : ”HKEY CURRENT USER\\Keyboard Layout \\ Pre l oad ”
,
16 ” va lue name ” : ”1”
17 }
18 ] ,




1 {”name” : ”Example − Order can be impor tan t ” ,
2 ”meta” : {
3 ” autho r ” : ”Oss igeno ” ,
4 ” d e s c r i p t i o n ” : ”Sometimes the o r d e r o f when the modules i s
matched i s impo r tan t ”
5 }
6 ”modules ” : [
7 {” s y s c a l l ” : ” V i r t u a l A l l o c ” ,
8 ”params : {
9 ” l pAdd r e s s ” : [ ” add r e s s ]
10 }
11 } ,
12 {” s t r u c t u r e ” : ”PEB” ,
13 ” o f f s e t ” : 2
14 } ,
15 {” r e g i s t r y ” : ”HKEY CURRENT USER\\Keyboard Layout \\ Pre l oad ”
,
16 ” va lue name ” : ”1”
17 }
18 ] ,
19 ”we ight ” : 5 ,
20 ” c o n d i t i o n ” : ” A l l ” ,
21 ” o r d e r ” : ”True”
22 }  
1 {”name” : ”Example − Va r i a b l e s ” ,
2 ”meta” : {
3 ” autho r ” : ”Oss igeno ” ,
4 ” d e s c r i p t i o n ” : ”Here you can unde r s tand how to use
v a r i a b l e s f o r your own r u l e s ”
5 } ,
6 ” v a r i a b l e s : [ ” add r e s s ” ]
7 ”modules ” : [
8 {” s y s c a l l ” : ” V i r t u a l A l l o c ” ,
9 ”params : {




13 {” s y s c a l l ” : ”memcpy” ,
14 ”params : {
15 ” de s t ” : [ ” add r e s s ]
16 }
17 } ,
18 {” s y s c a l l ” : ” V i r t u a l P r o t e c t ” ,
19 ”params : {




24 ”we ight ” : 10} 
A.0.2 Gandcrab
Keyboard Layout and User Language 
1 {”name” : ”Gandgrab − keyboard l a y o u t and u s e r l anguage ” ,
2 ”meta” : {
3 ” autho r ” : ”Oss igeno ” ,
4 ” d e s c r i p t i o n ” : ”The sample t r i e d to check the keyboard
l a y o u t ”
5 } , ,
6 ”modules ” : [
7 {
8 ”module” : ” R e g i s t r y ” ,
9 ” key ” : ”HKEY CURRENT USER\\Keyboard Layout \\ Pre l oad ” ,
10 ” va lue name ” : ”1”
11 } ,
12 {
13 ”module” : ”Api ” ,
14 ” s y s c a l l ” : ” GetUse rDe fau l tU ILanguage ”
15 } ,
16 {
17 ”module” : ”Api ” ,




21 ”we ight ” : 3 ,
22 ” c o n d i t i o n ” : ”Any”} 
Antivirus Process 
1 {
2 ”name” : ”Gandgrab − p r o c e s s e s ” ,
3 ”meta” : {
4 ” autho r ” : ”Oss igeno ” ,
5 ” d e s c r i p t i o n ” : ”The malware t r i e d to ga i n knowledge about
o t h e r p r o c e s s e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r i s check i ng i f a n t i v i r u s
a r e p r e s e n t ”
6 } ,
7 ”modules ” : [
8 {
9 ”module” : ”Api ” ,
10 ” s y s c a l l ” : ” C r ea t eToo l h e l p 32 Snapshot ” ,
11 ”params” : {




16 ”module” : ”Api ” ,
17 ” s y s c a l l ” : ” l s t rcmpiW” ,
18 ”params” : {




23 ”we ight ” : 8 ,
24 ” c o n d i t i o n ” : ” A l l ” ,
25 ” o r d e r ” : t r u e
26 } 
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Dump Os Version 
1 {”name” : ”Gandgrab − OS” ,
2 ”meta” : {
3 ” autho r ” : ”Oss igeno ” ,
4 ” d e s c r i p t i o n ” : ”The malware t r i e d to use V e r i f y V e r s i o n to
check which Windows v e r s i o n i s r unn ing ”
5 } ,
6 ” v a r i a b l e s ” : [ ” addr ” ] ,
7 ”modules ” : [
8 {
9 ”module” : ”Api ” ,
10 ” s y s c a l l ” : ” Ve r i f yVe r s i o n I n f oW ” ,
11 ”params” : {




16 ”module” : ”Api ” ,
17 ” s y s c a l l ” : ” GetToken In fo rmat ion ” ,
18 ”params” : {




23 ”we ight ” : 5 ,
24 ” c o n d i t i o n ” : ”Any” ,
25 ” a c t i o n s ” : [ ”dumpOs” ] }  
1 def old_dumpOs ( ql , variables ) :
2 syscall = ql . os . syscalls [ "VerifyVersionInfoW" ] [ - 1 ]
3 addr = syscall [ "params" ] [ "lpVersionInformation" ]
4 print ( hex ( addr ) )
5 osVersion = OsVersionInfoExA ( ql )
6 osVersion . read ( addr )
7 maj = osVersion . major [ 0 ]
8 minv = osVersion . minor [ 0 ]
9 prod = osVersion . product [ 0 ]






2 ”name” : ”Peb checks ” ,
3 ”meta” : {
4 ” autho r ” : ”Oss igeno ” ,
5 ” d e s c r i p t i o n ” : ” I n s i d e the PEB th e r e a r e some s p e c i f i c
a d d r e s s e s t ha t c o n t a i n s i n f o rma t i o n about the debugg ing
env i ronment ”
6 }
7 ”modules ” : [
8 {
9 ”module” : ”WatchPoint ” ,
10 ” s t r u c t u r e ” : ”PEB” ,
11 ” o f f s e t ” : 2 ,
12 ” type ” : ”Read”
13 } ,
14 {
15 ”module” : ”WatchPoint ” ,
16 ” s t r u c t u r e ” : ”PEB” ,
17 ” o f f s e t ” : 24 ,
18 ” type ” : ”Read”
19 }
20 ] ,
21 ”we ight ” : 6 ,




1 { ”name” : ”Debugging API” ,
2 ”meta” : {
3 ” autho r ” : ”Oss igeno ” ,
4 ” d e s c r i p t i o n ” : ”The sample t r i e d to ga i n i n f o rma t i o n the
env i ronment , qu e r y i n g one debugger API”
5 } ,
6 ”modules ” : [
7 {” s y s c a l l ” : ” I sDebugge rP r e s en t ”} ,
8 {” s y s c a l l ” : ”CheckRemoteDebuggerPresent ”} ,
9 {” s y s c a l l ” : ”Wudf I sUserDebuggerPresent ”} ,
10 {” s y s c a l l ” : ”Wudf IsAnyDebuggerPresent ”} ,
11 {” s y s c a l l ” : ”Wudf I sKerne lDebugge rPresent ”} ,
12 {” s y s c a l l ” : ” DebugAct i veProces s ”}
13 ] ,





1 { ” type ” : ” o b j e c t ” ,
2 ” p r o p e r t i e s ” : {
3 ”name” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ”} ,
4 ”meta” : {” type ” : ” o b j e c t ”} ,
5 ” c o n d i t i o n ” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ” , ”enum” : [ ”Any” , ” A l l ” ] } ,
6 ” o r d e r ” : {” type ” : ” boo l ean ”} ,
7 ”we ight ” : {” type ” : ” i n t e g e r ” , ” exc lus iveMin imum” : 0} ,
8 ” v a r i a b l e s ” : {” type ” : ” a r r a y ”} ,
9 ”modules ” : {
10 ” type ” : ” a r r a y ” ,
11 ” i t ems ” : {
12 ” type ” : ” o b j e c t ” ,
13 ” p r o p e r t i e s ” : {”module” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ” , ”
enum” : modules names }} ,
14 ” r e q u i r e d ” : [ ”module” ] ,
15 } ,
16 ” un ique I t ems ” : True ,
17 ”minItems ” : 1 ,
18 } ,
19 ” a c t i o n s ” : {
20 ” type ” : ” a r r a y ” ,
21 ” i t ems ” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ”} ,





25 ” r e q u i r e d ” : [ ”name” , ” c o n d i t i o n ” , ” we ight ” , ”modules ” ] ,
26 ” a d d i t i o n a l P r o p e r t i e s ” : F a l s e ,
27 } 
Api 
1 {” type ” : ” o b j e c t ” ,
2 ” p r o p e r t i e s ” : {
3 ”module” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ”} ,
4 ”params” : {” type ” : ” o b j e c t ” ,
5 ” p a t t e r n P r o p r i e t i e s ” : {
6 ”∗” : {
7 ” type ” : ” a r r a y ” ,
8 ” i t ems ” : {
9 ” type ” : [ ” i n t e g e r ” , ” s t r i n g ” ]
} ,




14 ” r e t u r n v a l u e ” : {
15 ” type ” : ” a r r a y ” ,
16 ” i t ems ” : {
17 ” type ” : ” i n t e g e r ”
18 } ,
19 ” un ique I t ems ” : True
20 } ,
21 ” s y s c a l l ” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ”}
22 } ,
23 ” r e q u i r e d ” : [ ” s y s c a l l ” ] ,
24 ” a d d i t i o n a l P r o p e r t i e s ” : F a l s e } 
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Dll 
1 {” type ” : ” o b j e c t ” ,
2 ” p r o p e r t i e s ” : {
3 ”module” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ”} ,
4 ” d l l ” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ”}
5 } ,
6 ” r e q u i r e d ” : [ ” d l l ” ] ,
7 ” a d d i t i o n a l P r o p e r t i e s ” : F a l s e } 
String 
1 {” type ” : ” o b j e c t ” ,
2 ” p r o p e r t i e s ” : {
3 ”module” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ”} ,
4 ” s t r i n g ” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ”} ,
5 ” ca se ” : {” type ” : ” boo l ean ”}
6 } ,
7 ” r e q u i r e d ” : [ ” s t r i n g ” ] ,
8 ” a d d i t i o n a l P r o p e r t i e s ” : F a l s e } 
WatchPoint 
1 {” type ” : ” o b j e c t ” ,
2 ” p r o p e r t i e s ” : {
3 ”module” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ”} ,
4 ” s t r u c t u r e ” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ” ,
5 ”enum” : [ ”PEB” ] } ,
6 ” o f f s e t ” : {” type ” : ” i n t e g e r ” ,
7 ” exc lus iveMin imum” : 0} ,
8 ” add r e s s ” : {” type ” : ” i n t e g e r ”}
9 } ,
10 ” a d d i t i o n a l P r o p e r t i e s ” : F a l s e ,
11 ”oneOf” : [
12 {” r e q u i r e d ” : [ ” s t r u c t u r e ” ] } ,
13 {” r e q u i r e d ” : [ ” add r e s s ” ] } ] } 
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Registry 
1 {” type ” : ” o b j e c t ” ,
2 ” p r o p e r t i e s ” : {
3 ”module” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ”} ,
4 ” key ” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ”} ,
5 ” va lue name ” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ”} ,
6 ” s e t ” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ”}
7 } ,
8 ” r e q u i r e d ” : [ ” key ” ] ,
9 ” a d d i t i o n a l P r o p e r t i e s ” : F a l s e } 
SubRule 
1 {” type ” : ” o b j e c t ” ,
2 ” p r o p e r t i e s ” : {
3 ”module” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ”} ,
4 ” s u b r u l e ” : {” type ” : ” s t r i n g ”}
5 } ,
6 ” r e q u i r e d ” : [ ” s u b r u l e ” ] ,
7 ” a d d i t i o n a l P r o p e r t i e s ” : F a l s e } 
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